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Abstract
Education is often perceived in policy agendas as playing a transformative role in realising sustainable development and the 
SDGs on the continent. The assumption is based, however, on an insufficiently critical understanding of the historical role 
of education in supporting unsustainable development. The article provides a critical account of the relationship between 
education policy and sustainable development in Africa as an aspect of the postcolonial condition, i.e. as an aspect of the 
colonial legacy and of Africa’s position in relation to contemporary processes of globalisation. It is argued that if education 
is to play a transformative role in relation to sustainable development then education policy needs to be fundamentally re-
oriented and harnessed to wider processes of economic, cultural and political transformation in the interests of social and 
environmental justice.
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Introduction
The paper provides a critical analysis of African regional 
policy agendas relating to education on the continent. Spe-
cifically, it will consider the African Union’s Agenda 2063 
document (e.g. AUC 2015) which sets out a pan-African 
vision of transformative sustainable development and the 
Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA) (AU 
2015) which aims to transform education systems so that 
they are commensurate with this wider vision. The aim of 
this article is to critically consider this strategy. It will do 
this by analysing regional agendas in relation to the ‘post-
colonial condition’ on the continent. This requires giving 
consideration to the longue durée of development on the 
continent since colonial times as well as Africa’s position 
on the margins of contemporary processes of globalisation. 
It is also argued that the postcolonial condition itself needs 
to be understood both discursively, i.e. in terms of the con-
stitutive effects of different discourses of development on 
the way that social reality and postcolonial identities are 
constructed but also materially, as an aspect of the cultural 
political economy of globalisation.
The view of education policy builds on recent work 
within the critical tradition (Mundy et al. 2017). At a global 
scale, this involves drawing attention to ‘meta-discourses’, 
or in Carney’s (Carney 2008) terms, ‘policyscapes’ that help 
to frame regional agendas. In this respect as mentioned, a 
key point of reference for Agenda 2063 and CESA is the 
adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Regional policy agendas then serve to mediate and reinter-
pret global policy in relation to regional interests and priori-
ties which are then mediated and reinterpreted at a national 
level. Following Ball et al. (2012), policy can therefore be 
understood as a series of socially constructed enactments 
that span text and practice. This draws attention to the gap 
between policy intentions on the one hand and what actu-
ally goes on at the level of practice on the other hand. It 
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also underlines the importance of the agency of policy mak-
ers at different scales in enacting policy and the extent to 
which policy simultaneously shapes and is shaped by social 
relations including those based on class, race, ethnicity and 
gender. The article will commence by sketching the main 
features of regional education policy. It will then critically 
analyse regional agendas in relation to three overlapping 
domains of the economy, culture and of the polity.
In developing a critique of Agenda 2063 and CESA, it 
is important to be explicit about the normative position on 
which the critique is based, namely a view of social and 
environmental justice. This has been set out at length else-
where (Tikly 2019). In this view, following Sen (2013) and 
Tikly and Barrett (2011), the role of education systems is to 
develop the capabilities (opportunity freedoms) of existing 
and future generations to achieve sustainable livelihoods and 
well-being within peaceful and democratic societies. This 
requires taking account of the institutional barriers facing 
disadvantaged groups in realising valued capabilities and 
functionings. By institutionalised obstacles, Fraser (2008) 
draws attention to economic structures that deny access to 
resources that people need in order to interact with others 
as peers; institutionalised hierarchies of cultural value that 
may deny them the requisite standing; and exclusion from 
the community that is entitled to make justice claims on one 
another and the procedures that structure public processes 
of contestation. Recognising issues of environmental justice 
also requires extending the view of parity of participation to 
include a consideration of the rights and capabilities of other 
species and of environmental systems.
Fraser draws attention to three dimensions of social jus-
tice, each related to one of the institutional barriers. The 
first, redistribution, relates to access to different kinds of 
material resources or to services such as education and 
health. From the point of view of SD, distributive justice 
would also need to take account of the way that environ-
mental benefits (in the form of access to natural resources) 
as well as risks (in the form of the effects of global warm-
ing, droughts, famines, pollution, etc.) are distributed. The 
second of Fraser’s dimensions, recognition, means first 
identifying and then acknowledging the claims of histori-
cally marginalised groups in the African context including, 
for example, women, rural dwellers, victims of HIV/AIDS 
orphans and vulnerable children, refugees, cultural, linguis-
tic, religious, racial and sexual minorities and indigenous 
groups. In the context of a transformative SD and ESD, this 
also means recognising the integrity and the right to flourish 
other species and ecosystems, a view that is in keeping with 
many indigenous knowledge systems in Africa that have pos-
ited a more organic, symbiotic and custodial relationship 
between human beings and the natural world (Maware and 
Mubaye 2016).1 Participatory justice includes the rights of 
individuals and groups to have their voices heard in debates 
about social justice and injustice and to actively participate 
in decision-making. Importantly, for Fraser, this is a prereq-
uisite for realising issues of redistribution and recognition.2
Education for sustainable development as it 
is set out in regional agendas
This section provides a brief overview of the two key policy 
texts to be considered, namely, the Agenda 2063 Frame-
work Document: The Africa we want (Agenda 2063 for 
short) (AUC 2015) and the Continental Education Strategy 
for Africa (CESA). The documents set out a transforma-
tive vision for Sustainable Development (SD) and for Edu-
cation for Sustainable Development (ESD), respectively, 
linked to a pan-African vision of a united and prosperous 
Africa. SD and ESD have achieved a hegemonic status as 
global discourses, thanks to the adoption of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The two documents can be seen 
as regional responses to the SDGs. Adopted by the Afri-
can Union in 2015, Agenda 2063 sets out an aspirational 
50-year programme of action for the continent framed within 
an over-arching commitment to pan-Africanism, inclusive 
growth, sustainable development and a vision of an African 
Renaissance.3 The vision is for ‘an integrated, prosperous 
1 For Schlosberg (2007), it is this aspect of recognitional justice that 
sets his view of environmental justice apart for that of Nussbaum’s in 
that the focus is on the flourishing of whole ecosystems rather than on 
the rights of individual animals. This also leads to a non-romanticised 
view of environmental flourishing in that, for example, being food for 
other living beings might form the part of essence of functioning for 
some living things.
2 It also ties in with Sen’s insistence on public participation and 
informed public dialogue as the basis for adjudication between justice 
claims. Schlosberg (2007) noting the obvious point that other species 
or natural systems do not have the same reasoning or communica-
tive capacities to participate in processes of democratic deliberation, 
nonetheless argues that the capabilities and flourishing of other spe-
cies and natural systems can and ought to be the subject of public 
deliberation.
3 The origins of Agenda 2063 lie in the Golden Jubilee of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now the African Union (AU). 
The AU summit tasked the African Union Commission (AUC), sup-
ported but the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
the Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), the African Devel-
opment Bank (AfDB) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) to prepare a 50-year continental agenda. This was to be 
achieved through an extensive consultative process involving a series 
of meetings across the continent with stakeholders spanning many 
areas of African society including youth, women, civil society organi-
sations, the diaspora, African think tanks and research institutes, 
planners, the private sector, religious organisations, the Forum for 
Former African Heads of State and others. This gave rise to the Aspi-
rations of the African People, the driver of Agenda 2063.
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and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and repre-
senting a dynamic force in the international arena’ (iv). It 
is based on a recognition of the enormous wealth of the 
continent in natural resources and the resilience and cultural 
resourcefulness of African peoples.
In economic terms, Agenda 2063 revolves around the 
vision of a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and 
sustainable development. Key to this priority is the eradi-
cation of poverty in one generation and building; sharing 
prosperity through social and economic transformation and 
with the means and resources to drive its own development; 
and an Africa whose development is people-driven, rely-
ing on the potential of African people, especially its women 
and youth, and caring for children. This includes sustainable 
and long-term stewardship of its natural resources. In politi-
cal terms, Agenda 2063 calls for an integrated continent, 
politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism. 
It also sets out a vision of an Africa of good governance, 
democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of 
law and a peaceful and secure Africa and Africa as a strong, 
united and influential global player and partner. In cultural 
terms, the document aspires towards an Africa with a strong 
cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics 
(AUC 2015).
The Continental Education Strategy for Africa 2016–2025 
(CESA) (AU 2015) was developed under the auspices of 
the African Union. It provides continuity on the central role 
accorded to education in Agenda 2063. Developing the pri-
orities identified by African Ministers of Education set out 
in the Kigali Declaration that fed into the SDG consultation 
process can also be seen as a regional response to the educa-
tion SDG. As such it presents an overall vision of African-
led ESD and a set of regional priorities for implementing 
ESD in a way that is consistent with the Pan-African vision 
of an African Renaissance. Like the Agenda 2063, the CESA 
sets out a series of challenges facing education and these are 
discussed in more detail in later sections. In tackling these 
challenges, CESA sets out 12 strategic objectives aimed at 
revitalszation of the teaching profession; expanding access 
to quality education for all; harnessing the capacity of ICT; 
encouraging processes of national and regional integra-
tion; accelerating gender parity and equity; improving adult 
and youth literacy; strengthening science and mathematics 
education; expanding technical and vocational and higher 
education; promoting peace education; improving the man-
agement of education systems; and setting up a coalition of 
stakeholders to implement policy.
It is instructive to consider how the priorities contained 
in Agenda 2063 and in CESA relate to global discourses 
about sustainable development (SD) and education for sus-
tainable development, respectively. As Blewitt (2018) has 
noted, global debates about the meaning of SD involve 
sometimes contradictory discourses linked to differing 
starting assumptions and normative frameworks. In this 
regard, SD can best be understood as an example of a ‘float-
ing signifier’ (Laclau 2005; Kogl and Kurze 2013). That is 
to say that what the term has come to signify has shifted 
over time and in relation to context and is slippery to define. 
It is also something of a ‘metafix’ (Lélé 1991) in that it has 
been perceived to mean ‘all things to all people’ and has 
been used to quilt together disparate interests in the field of 
international development. In the context of Agenda 2063, 
the most obvious discourse is that of pan-Africanism. Here, 
SD is presented principally in terms of an African Renais-
sance drawing on a long history of pan-Africanism on the 
continent. ESD is principally understood as a vehicle for 
promoting African cultures, values and languages. However, 
the dominant version of SD in Agenda 2063 is organised 
around the idea of ‘inclusive growth’.
This discourse presents SD principally in economic terms 
and centres on an ideal of growth that has the effect of reduc-
ing absolute poverty and that is achieved through the use 
of green technologies. The discourse follows a trajectory 
from previous hegemonic development discourses includ-
ing modernisation theory and neoliberalism and includes 
ideas from environmental economics. The dominant view 
of ESD linked to this discourse is one that sees education 
principally in terms of producing human capital. Agenda 
2063 also alludes to discourses on human rights in which 
SD is seen mainly in relation to social development and the 
protection and advancement of human rights. ESD in this 
discourse is principally concerned with expanding the right 
to a good quality education and linked to the realisation of 
the education SDG (SDG4). Finally, there is evidence of 
the impact of environmentalism and this finds expression in 
concerns about ‘environmental protection’. Globally, these 
are often associated with forms of environmental education 
(Wals and Geke 2010) although as we will see, references 
to environmental education are not evident in the CESA.
Interpreting regional policy in relation 
to the postcolonial condition
In this section, an attempt will be made to explore educa-
tion’s role in relation to the three inter-related institutional 
domains of the economy, culture and the polity. Follow-
ing Walby (2009), these are conceived as complex insti-
tutional domains. Development is seen as a consequence 
of the co-evolution of these domains—there is no simple 
causal impact on one domain over the rest (e.g. the eco-
nomic domain over the other two) and change is multi-rather 
than unidirectional in nature. These three domains have 
been identified as being particularly relevant for capturing 
the complexity of the postcolonial condition in education. 
Importantly, for our purposes whilst the environmental 
 L. Tikly 
1 3
domain is also highly significant this is not included as a 
distinct focus for analysis in its own right. This is not to elide 
the importance of the environmental domain. Rather, it is to 
acknowledge that for the purposes of the analysis below, 
environmental concerns are considered to permeate each of 
the three identified domains and that the influence of the 
education policy—and indeed of all areas of policy on the 
environmental domain is mediated via its impact on the eco-
nomic, cultural and political domains. Cutting across each 
domain are regimes of inequality including those around 
class, race, gender, urban/rural location, etc. Like domains, 
these are conceived as complex, intersecting systems (Walby 
2009).
Each of the following sections begins with an overview of 
how each domain is conceptualised in relation to the wider 
understanding of the postcolonial condition. Attention will 
then turn to sketching out in broad terms how each domain 
has developed since colonial times and how education has 
been implicated in these developments. This will provide a 
basis for critically considering how regional agendas con-
ceive of sustainable development in relation to each domain 
including the role of education. The key argument advanced 
is that the dominant development trajectory has been along 
the lines of unsustainable development when considered in 
relation to social and environmental justice and that educa-
tion has been deeply implicated in this trajectory. It will also 
be argued that whilst the Agenda 2063 and CESA go some 
way towards setting out transformative, Africa-led agenda 
for SD and ESD, they are limited by the predominance of 
narrow instrumentalist concerns linked to global and indig-
enous elite interests.
Education and the economic domain
The economic domain is conceived as a system of relations, 
institutions and processes concerned with the production, 
consumption, distribution, and circulation of goods and ser-
vices to support human life whilst protecting the planet. It 
therefore includes not only marketized activities, but also 
domestic labour, state welfare and predominantly ‘social’ 
institutions like education. It is also an institutional domain 
that is implicated in multiple regimes of inequality includ-
ing not only class but inequalities based on gender, race, 
ethnicity and urban/rural location. Space does not allow 
for anything other than a brief sketch of how the economic 
domain has developed since colonial times. It is argued that 
the current path dependency of African economies is based 
largely on the extraction of raw materials and that this path 
dependency is deeply entrenched and linked to economic 
interests that can be traced back to colonial times. Euro-
pean colonialism from the sixteenth century onwards was 
based largely on the extraction of raw materials including 
agricultural products and minerals from the global South 
which were then converted into commodities in the global 
North and sold back to the global South often at a profit 
(see for example Rodney 1973; Hoogvelt 1997; Akyeam-
pong et al. 2014). A key motive for European colonisation 
of Africa was economic and political competition between 
the European powers which became known as the ‘scramble 
for Africa’. The colonial economy was also based on the 
extraction of an estimated 12 to 15 million Africans in the 
form of the transatlantic slave trade. Whilst the slave trade 
benefitted development in the America’s it led to a huge loss 
of people and skills and played a significant role in holding 
back development on the African continent (Akyeampong 
et al. 2014; Eltis and Richardson 2008).
Even after independence, as Nkrumah (1966) pointed out 
in his seminal account of neo-colonialism, economic rela-
tionships between Africa and the countries of the former 
metropole continued to be based on the extraction of raw 
materials to support industrialisation in the global North. 
The emergence of neoliberalism as a global wave from the 
late 1970s had a major re-territorialising effect on Africa’s 
relations with the global economy. The introduction of Sta-
bilisation and Structural Adjustment Polices (SAPs) by the 
major financial institutions were a response to the debt cri-
sis of the 1970s (Robertson et al. 2007). They included a 
range of measures related to fiscal austerity, deregulating 
the economy and opening it up to international competi-
tion, rolling back the ambit of the state in financing public 
services and encouraging privatisation. The impact of SAPS 
were devastating in terms of human development and led 
to the so-called lost decades of development. The call for 
‘adjustment with a human face’ (Robertson et al. 2007) rep-
resented a challenge to the international financial institutions 
whose policies, despite never calling explicitly for budget 
cuts to health and education, had nonetheless pushed many 
low-income countries (as well as those in the ‘north’) into 
prioritising debt repayments over social spending.
As Harvey (2011) has argued, the development of neo-
liberalism since the 1970s was a consequence of capital-
ist over-accumulation in the global North and the need to 
restore the profitability of capital. The major political trans-
formations in the former Soviet Union and in China also 
served to release hitherto unavailable assets into the global 
economy as has unprecedented growth in South East Asia 
in the wake of the 2007 shock. These developments are 
associated with changes in the locus of power and influence 
within the global economy. Over-accumulation of capital has 
contributed to a ‘revitalisation of primitive accumulation’ 
(Harvey 2003) (that is accumulation that is based on the 
extraction of primary commodities and on cheap labour) as a 
way of increasing the profitability of capital. It is this turn to 
primitive accumulation together with concerns about energy 
and food security in China, the US and elsewhere that lies 
behind the ‘new scramble for Africa’ (Ayers 2013; Mohan 
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2013). This has involved investing Western based capital 
and to a lesser extent capital linked to China and the other 
rising powers in extractive mining industries and agriculture.
Thus whilst as is suggested in the Agenda 2063, the new 
scramble for Africa has coincided with a period of economic 
growth especially following the 2007 financial crisis, it has 
not led to sizeable gains for ordinary Africans because 
as Ferguson (2006) has pointed out, the vast majority of 
this growth has been through foreign investment and has 
occurred in enclaves and have remained shut off from local 
communities who have not benefited directly. It has also 
happened in the form of land grabs in which vast areas of 
land have been effectively privatised and sold off to foreign 
interests (see also Ayers 2013) and which has had dire conse-
quences for human and environmental development as noted 
in the Agenda 2063. China has also exported large numbers 
of labourers to work on agricultural and infrastructure pro-
jects in Africa such that in many cases, new projects have 
often not led to increased opportunities for the employment 
of Africans themselves (Mohan 2013).
The devastating social and environmental consequences 
of extractive economic practices noted in the Agenda 2063 
can also be traced back to colonial times. The introduction of 
mining under colonialism and the migratory system resulted 
in long periods of absence for African men. This in turn had 
the effect of disrupting family and kinship arrangements, 
diminishing men’s roles in resource management and hugely 
increasing the workload of African women. As economic 
historians have argued (see for example Akyeampong et al. 
2014; Ghai 1992), changes in the economy brought about 
by colonialism had a significant impact on environmental 
degradation and disrupted the long-established systems of 
resource management which had relied on shifting culti-
vation and nomadic pastoralism. As noted in the Agenda 
2063, the continent continues to face huge environmental 
challenges from drought to deforestation to soil erosion, 
desertification, pollution and toxic waste dumping. A very 
real manifestation of the impact of the new scramble for 
Africa coupled with processes of global warming has been 
the speeding up of processes of environmental degrada-
tion on the continent (Ayers 2013). Furthermore, in spite 
of agreements made in the UN Stockholm Declaration or at 
the Basel Convention, practices such as the dumping of over 
five hundred tons of toxic waste in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire 
in 2006—coined as ‘toxic colonialism’ by Greenpeace—
assumes disproportionate risks between ‘developed’ and 
‘underdeveloped’ countries (Pratt 2011). For some expo-
nents of neoliberalism, environmental degradation is seen as 
a form of collateral damage (Shiva 2000, p. 65). In the mean-
time, a lack of investment in renewable sources of energy in 
which Africa is abundant (from solar power to biofuel) has 
increased dependency on fossil fuels which is contributing 
heavily to processes of deforestation.
To some extent, Agenda 2063 acknowledges many 
of the tensions and contradictions identified above. It 
acknowledges, for example, that whilst there has been 
unprecedented growth on the continent, this growth has 
been linked to the prevalence of extractive economic poli-
cies and has been distributed unevenly within and between 
countries (AUC 2015, p. 31). It also notes the damag-
ing environmental consequences of untrammelled growth 
based on extractive practices. In setting out a vision for 
inclusive green growth, Agenda 2063 argues for a fairer 
distribution of the benefits of economic growth and a 
greening of the economy. In order to achieve these goals, 
it proposes a raft of measures including mobilising domes-
tic resource as a means to reduce poverty and to improve 
people’s livelihoods, modernise the agricultural sector 
whilst diversifying the economy including developing the 
service sector and encouraging industrialization based on 
science, technology and innovation. Education is impli-
cated as playing a crucial role in this respect although as 
we will see, this has contradictory implications.
There is little mention in the document, however, of the 
practical means by which these policies will be achieved and 
by which leaders may be held to account. Missing from the 
analysis contained in the Agenda 2063 is a recognition of the 
indigenous as well as foreign interests that have been served 
through the predominance of different kinds of extractive 
practices. Thus, whilst under colonialism it was the mercan-
tile classes within the colonial powers that benefited most 
from the extraction of raw materials from Africa, in the post-
independence period indigenous elites have also benefitted 
through their access to state power and capital. In brief, there 
are key tensions in Agenda 2063 between the idea of inclu-
sive, green growth as postulated in the document on the one 
hand and the predominance of practices and related interests 
linked to neoliberal policies and the maintenance of extrac-
tive practices on the other hand.
In this respect, it is important to recognise that the idea 
of inclusive growth is itself contested between more market-
led, neoliberal approaches such as postulated by the World 
Bank (e.g. Ianchovichina and Lundstrom 2009) in which 
poverty alleviation is seen as a consequence of the trickle-
down effect and ideas in which the taste has greater role in 
redistributing wealth (UNDP 2017). This tension is present 
in Agenda 2063 although it is arguably the neo-liberal ver-
sion that predominates and this is reflected, for example, in 
the advocacy for privatisation in education (below). Also 
missing from Agenda 2063 is reference to the critique of the 
very idea of growth by environmentalists who have instead 
argued for ideas of degrowth (Latouche 2010) to prosper-
ity without growth (Jackson 2016) or post-growth (Blewitt 
2018) on the basis that natural resources are limited and 
the damage that growth under has historically wrought on 
natural systems.
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Regional education policy and the economic 
domain
There are two main ways in which education can be said to 
relate to the economic domain, namely the links between 
education and the skills and competencies required for eco-
nomic development on the one hand and in the way that 
education is provided and funded on the other hand. Start-
ing with the former, colonial education policy on the Afri-
can continent was driven by a complex mixture of differing 
colonial interests and motives, as historians have made clear 
(see for example Mangan 1988; Altbach and Kelly 1978). It 
is also important to take account of differences between the 
colonial powers in the way that colonial education was con-
ceived in relation to the broader ‘civilising mission’ (White 
1996). A key rationale, for the introduction of forms of mass 
education under colonialism, however, was economic. In all 
cases, access to education was not universal and was for 
most learners limited to a few years of basic education with 
very limited access indeed to secondary education. In both 
cases too there was limited access to secondary education as 
a means to develop a small cadre of Africans who could staff 
the colonial administrations and provide a point of contact 
with ordinary Africans.
Colonial education can be said to have had both a positive 
and a negative correspondence with the economic domain 
under colonialism. For example, whilst colonial education 
policy was geared towards supporting the rural economy, 
the reality was a loss of rural livelihoods for Africans in the 
context of mass urbanisation. In the run-up to independence, 
there was also increasing resentment on the part of Africans 
towards an agriculturally and vocationally oriented educa-
tion and growing demands for an expansion of secondary 
education which was associated with an elite position in the 
colonial administration. The elitist nature of education has 
persisted in the postcolonial period. Indeed, it has been a 
defining characteristic of the path dependency adopted by 
African education systems that until relatively recently they 
have been characterised by low levels of access for the poor-
est, outmoded, content-driven curricula and assessment sys-
tems that are both cognitively and linguistically demanding 
and that have played a strong filtering role in limiting access 
to higher levels of education.
Two key discourses were key in defining education policy 
across the postcolonial world in the immediate post-inde-
pendence period. Besides modernisation theory (above) 
which identified education as a key institution for devel-
oping the skills required for a modern economy, the other 
was human capital theory originally developed by Thoedore 
Schultz (1961). The latter has proved durable although it has 
changed in form and emphasis over the years (Robertson 
et al. 2007) and is still evident in regional agendas. During 
the 1960s and 1970s it was associated with modernisation 
theory, in the 1980s with the development of rates of return 
analysis (below) and from the 1990s with the role of edu-
cation in poverty reduction and subsequently in promoting 
inclusive growth and the knowledge economy. Regional 
policy continues to be heavily influenced by both of these 
discourses. As noted, education is principally seen in terms 
of providing the human capital required to modernise the 
economy and to develop knowledge economies.
This belief, although still very popular amongst main-
stream economists and policy makers has been subject to 
sustained criticism. Further, as has been extensively argued 
elsewhere (e.g. Tikly 2003; Robertson et al. 2007), human 
capital theory is based on an idealised view of the role of 
education as a panacea for economic development. A linear 
relationship between the development of skills and economic 
growth is often assumed. This fails to take account of the 
effects of economic crisis in shaping the ability of educa-
tion systems to function effectively and to provide the skills 
actually required by economies (for example, as discussed, 
neoliberal responses to economic crisis in the 1970s and 
1980s led to a reduction in investments in social institu-
tions such as education). Similar arguments can be made 
about the possibility of education systems to produce the 
so-called ‘green skills’ that can transform economies as the 
greening of the economy relies fundamentally on changes 
in the nature of production processes themselves (McGrath 
and Powell 2016).
Closely linked to human capital theory is the ideas that 
education can contribute to the development of knowledge 
economies. Ideas about the knowledge economy which are 
not new to the continent have also been subject to critique. 
Resting on the four pillars of education and training, the 
development of an information infrastructure, providing an 
economic and institutional regime to support knowledge 
flows and supporting innovation systems, the idea of the 
knowledge economy has been advocated by the World Bank 
since the 1990s (Robertson et al. 2007). Policies linked to 
the idea of the knowledge economy find prominent expres-
sion in the education and training policies of several Afri-
can countries including, for instance, Rwanda and Tanza-
nia (Tikly et al. 2003). However, the ideal of a knowledge 
economy stands in stark contrast to the realities faced by 
millions of Africans relying on meagre incomes obtained 
from subsistence agriculture and the informal economy. As 
has been argued elsewhere, whilst the idea of a knowledge 
economy is intuitively appealing to policy makers, it can 
often operate rhetorically as a panacea for solving economic 
crisis that has its roots in Africa’s position in relation to the 
global economy and unequal social relations of production.
Ideas about the knowledge economy lead to the emphasis 
in CESA on the instrumental aspects of schooling and espe-
cially science and mathematics education, the development 
of higher order technical and vocational skills and the role 
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of higher education in supporting innovation and enterprise. 
However, as has been recently argued with respect to STEM 
education in Africa, developing creativity, problem-solving 
and other kinds of skills necessary for innovation and enter-
prise also involves an emphasis on the creative arts and 
humanities as well as science and mathematics (Tikly et al. 
2018). At a more fundamental level, only emphasising those 
skills that are needed to promote economic growth leads to a 
narrow instrumental view of education. For economists such 
as Amartya Sen for example, growth, whilst important, is a 
means to achieving well-being and realising human free-
dom rather than an end in itself (Sen 1999). In this case, the 
role of education is perceived more broadly as developing 
capabilities (opportunity freedoms) that lead to valued func-
tionings (beings and doings) (Tikly and Barrett 2011). This 
in turn requires exposure to a full and balanced curriculum 
that can lead to the development of a full range of cognitive, 
affective and creative capabilities required to support sus-
tainable livelihoods and well-being. Importantly, given the 
recognition of environmental crisis in Agenda 2063, there is 
a need to develop the capabilities of learners through envi-
ronmental education and forms of transformative learning 
to engage in transformational change in their communities 
(e.g. Lotz-Sisitka et al. 2017). These concerns are totally 
absent from CESA.
In relation to the second main aspect of the education/
economy relationship, namely how education should be 
funded, CESA contains ambitious targets for the education 
sector. The document argues for an expansion of access at 
all levels of schooling including for historically marginalised 
groups such as rural dwellers and girls as a means for tack-
ling poverty and inequality. CESA argues for an increase in 
the basic education cycle from 6 to 9 years so as to encom-
pass lower secondary school.4 The expansion envisaged has 
major implications for the funding of education. UNESCO 
estimates that an additional 17 million teachers will need to 
be recruited across the continent by 2030 to meet the envis-
aged expansion in learner numbers. There is a need also to 
focus on the professional development of teachers and the 
provision of teaching and learning materials including text-
books. Research has also revealed the shortage of basic lab 
equipment for the teaching of science in secondary schools 
which is a major barrier to learning STEM-related skills (see 
below). Expanding education will also involve a large invest-
ment in infrastructure including building tens of thousands 
of additional classrooms and investing in sanitary facilities 
(UNESCO 2017).5 Another factor affecting health is the lack 
of drinking water with over half of all primary schools in 
Africa not having access to any drinking water. A key pri-
ority in CESA is the greater use of ICT to support learning 
in schools. However, the majority of schools in the region 
report no access to electricity with more than 95% of schools 
not having access in many countries. Unsurprisingly, this 
limits the possibilities for using ICTs in education except 
for in the most advantaged state and private schools. This 
includes computers but also older ICTs such as radios and 
televisions (see Footnote 4). The vast majority of schools 
are also without reliable internet connectivity, specially at 
primary school level and in the rural areas (see Footnote 5) 
(UNESCO 2017). At present, patterns of government fund-
ing for schools are highly unequal with implications for dis-
tributive justice and for the principle of inclusion.6
Although the objectives for CESA have not been costed 
(see Footnote 6), UNESCO’s costing estimates and spend-
ing projections to 2030 for the achievement of education 
targets suggest that, on average, countries will need to have 
increased spending on pre-primary, primary and secondary 
education from 3.5 to 6.3% of GDP between 2012 and 2030 
(UNESCO 2013). In the majority of countries in SSA, the 
costs will need to triple as a percentage of GDP in order to 
expand access of education to all including the most mar-
ginalised groups. This means that funding the proposals in 
CESA is likely to remain heavily dependent on donors.7 The 
reliance of African governments on donor funding, however, 
provides a source of contradiction and tension in regional 
agendas. This is partly on account of the vagaries of levels 
of donor funding which can fluctuate, making it difficult for 
governments to plan ahead. Further, funding is linked to 
diverse donor priorities with implications for the coherence 
of the system as a whole. Part of the reason for this is that 
the aid regime as a whole reflects in large measure the geo-
political interests of donors and tends to be concentrated in 
countries that serve these interests.
In meeting the above challenges, CESA also advocates 
the use of public private partnerships in the provision of 
schooling it will be suggested that CESA contains contra-
dictory messages concerning the role of the state in the 
4 Only a third of countries in sub-Saharan Africa currently guaran-
tee this compared to 64% of countries globally. Currently, 21% of pri-
mary school age children, 36% of lower secondary school age adoles-
cents and 57% of upper secondary school age youth in Africa are not 
enrolled (UNESCO 2017).
5 In many cases, girls have to share toilets with boys which has impli-
cations for the safety, health and dignity of girls, especially after the 
onset of puberty and is one cause of girls dropping out from schools 
(UNESCO 2017).
6 One aspect of this is the skewing of education budgets towards sec-
ondary and higher education.
7 Approximately 20% of total public expenditure on education came 
from donors although there has been a decline in donor funding, par-
ticularly for primary education (Steer and Smith 2015). UNESCO 
has estimated that donor financing for basic and secondary education 
will need to increase seven fold in order to fill the funding gap left by 
shortfalls in government expenditure.
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provision of schooling. Parents/communities have histori-
cally had to contribute to the costs of schooling. It is esti-
mated that across SSA, households currently contribute 33% 
of total domestic public spending on education at primary 
and 68% at the lower secondary level. The amount of house-
hold expenditure on schooling increases in countries with 
higher numbers of private schools which also has implica-
tions for equity (below). Private schools were present under 
colonialism, often serving the children of European settlers 
and indigenous elites. They were often allowed to flourish 
in the postcolonial era, providing a key institution for the 
reproduction of the class privilege enjoyed by indigenous 
elites. As Ilon (1994) points out, as part of structural adjust-
ment lending, policies supporting private schools and the 
introduction of user fees were introduced by many govern-
ments as part of a hollowing out of state provision.
This led to middle class ‘flight’ from the system which 
in turn led to an increasing reluctance on the part of this 
group to pay taxes to support state schools. The consequence 
was a decline in the quality of government schools which 
in turn impacted negatively on enrolments. More recently, 
the privatisation agenda with the active backing of Western 
governments has led to the proliferation of low-fee private 
schools targeted at low-income families. Virtually, the entire 
basic education system in Liberia, for example, has been 
outsourced to chains of foreign owned private providers. 
Available evidence is mixed concerning the impact of low-
fee private schools on learning outcomes in Africa and else-
where (Day et al. 2014; Verger et al. 2016) and these schools 
often remain out of reach for the poorest. The unregulated 
expansion in the number of private providers has exacer-
bated the already fragmented and incoherent nature of many 
African education systems.
According to Ilon’s writing as she was in the 1990s and 
in the aftermath of the introduction of SAPs policies, ‘a 
national system of schooling is likely to give way to local 
systems for the poor and global systems for the rich’ (p. 99). 
Within this highly differentiated environment, a top tier will 
benefit from a private education that will make them glob-
ally competitive; a middle tier will receive a ‘good’ but not 
‘world class’ education, whilst the majority, third tier, will 
have a local, state education that will make them ‘marginally 
competitive for low-skill jobs’ (p. 102). In very large meas-
ure, Ilon’s predictions have been realised although with the 
caveat that millions of children on the continent still have no 
access to any form of education at all. It can be argued that 
this educational scenario, whilst having a negative corre-
spondence with the longer-term aspirations for SD contained 
in Agenda 2063, actually enjoys a positive correspondence 
with the existing system of global capitalism in which Afri-
can elites have limited access to economic opportunities and 
resources but the majority can expect a lifetime of poverty 
in the rural and urban areas with limited opportunities on 
the margins of the economy punctuated by long period of 
unemployment.
An alternative to privatisation, as Lewin has argued, is 
financing schooling through progressive forms of taxation 
which remains one of the surest ways to ensure access to a 
good quality education in highly unequal societies (Lewin 
2018) although this in turn relies on reforms to the tax sys-
tem and improvements in the efficiently of tax collection. 
There are, however, other areas of the budget such as mili-
tary spending which has increased in many African coun-
tries over the past 10 years. As Lewin (2018) has argued, 
reduction in military spending and a subsequent increase 
in educational spending could be seen in terms of a peace 
dividend and could make a significant contribution to edu-
cational finance if governments chose to deploy resources 
in this way. Further, the cost for donors to meet their obli-
gations for funding SDG4 whilst appearing large overall is 
equal to just 8 days of annual global military expenditure, 
which totalled US $1.75 trillion in 2013 (UNESCO 2019).
Education and the cultural domain
The cultural domain is concerned primarily with institutions 
that are responsible for producing and reproducing systems 
of signification and meaning including those of language, 
religion/morality and knowledge itself including western and 
indigenous forms of knowledge. These include organisations 
in civil society including the mass media, religious organi-
sations, museums and traditional authorities. Educational 
institutions are deeply implicated in the cultural domain. 
Taken together, cultural systems of signification and mean-
ing are constitutive of individual and group identities. The 
cultural domain is also deeply implicated it will be argued 
in pedagogy both in terms of the relationship between the 
content of the curriculum and the cultural backgrounds of 
learners and the role of language in the classroom as a way 
of mediating the teaching and learning process.
The cultural basis of colonial rule
At a discursive level, a key rationale for colonialism was 
in terms of the so-called ‘civilising mission’ of the white 
man (sic). Underpinning this view, however, lays different 
explanations. Some of these were founded on a reading of 
the bible and particularly the old testament in which Afri-
cans are portrayed as heathens and as ‘hewers of wood and 
drawers of water’. This particular reading of the old tes-
tament was influential, for example, in legitimising apart-
heid in South Africa (Tikly 1994). Also influential were 
changing discourses around race, nation and culture that 
assumed the biological and cultural inferiority of the non-
European ‘other’. In the context of the growth of the Eugen-
ics movement in the late nineteenth century, the inferiority 
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of Africans was underpinned by a virulent scientific racism 
that posited a hierarchy between the races with white, aris-
tocratic Europeans at the top and Africans at the bottom of 
the hierarchy (Gould 1996; Loomba 2005). As Williams and 
Young (2009) have argued, in the lead up to independence, 
the civilising mission of whites was increasingly articulated 
with a modernist view of progress in which educated, Afri-
can elites were seen as indigenous agents of modernity.
This view of progress provided a source of contradiction 
with the virulent forms of religious, racial and cultural rac-
ism with which it co-evolved. As Franz Fanon along with 
many other anti-colonial activists and advocates of Pan-
Africanism have pointed out, this has had a long-lasting, 
negative effect on the African psyche, leading to a situation 
where Africans have at times rejected their own cultural 
values in favour of European ones and, so it is argued, have 
been complicit in their own subjugation (see for example 
Fanon 1961, 1986). Discourses about ‘race’ were also cen-
tral to emerging ideas about ‘development’. Whereas clas-
sical colonialism was premised on the view that although 
the ‘natives’ could be ‘civilised’ to some degree, they could 
never achieve equality with the West, in ‘development’ 
discourse, it became possible for underdeveloped regions 
and populations to evolve into developed ones. This did not 
mean, however, that the previously colonised were now seen 
as cultural ‘equals’ with the West, at least until they had 
become more ‘westernised’ (Rist 1997).
Regional agendas, education and the possibilities 
for an African cultural renaissance
The pan-African influence in the Agenda 2063 is perhaps 
most evident in relation to discussions about the cultural 
domain. As the Agenda 2063 notes, education has histori-
cally been a key institution for the imposition of Western 
cultural hegemony. Thus, overall the colonial curriculum 
introduced a Western episteme (ground base of knowledge) 
which differed considerably from indigenous knowledge sys-
tems but also from other forms of education in Africa such 
as Qur’anic education (Launey 2016). Similarly, in relation 
to assessment, the introduction of competitive examinations 
in the context of a highly selective education system stood 
in contrast to the role of assessment in traditional African 
education which focused on demonstrating relevant knowl-
edge and skills on the job to one’s elders and peers (Rodney 
1973). In brief, at a cultural level, education was complicit 
in the spreading of a Western views of modernity that were 
seen as superior both to African cultures and religions and 
to Islam which had been long established on the continent 
thanks to earlier waves of globalisation.
Where the Agenda 2063 is less explicit is in identify-
ing the role of Western education in the process of elite 
formation. As noted above, the French approach was more 
assimilationist in its orientation towards education. A key 
component of the approach was the use of French as the 
medium of instruction at all levels of the education system. 
Whilst there was an emphasis on a curriculum more suited 
to the rural areas at primary level, there existed a stronger 
emphasis on the ‘formation’ of African elites into French 
culture through secondary and latterly tertiary education 
(from the turn of the twentieth century up to independence 
this policy became one of ‘association’ aimed explicitly at 
developing modern African elites who could assume leader-
ship roles albeit in the French image). The British by way 
of contrast, explicitly pursued a policy of ‘adapted educa-
tion’. This meant teaching in the mother tongue at primary 
level and a curriculum ‘adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, 
occupations and traditions of the various peoples’ and par-
ticularly focused on developing agricultural and other skills 
suited to life in the rural areas (White 1996, p. 19) but pro-
moting English at secondary and tertiary level.
The Eurocentric and elitist nature of colonial schooling 
has proved remarkably enduring. The advent of modernisa-
tion theory continued to equate good quality education with 
a Western view of modernity and this continued to imply a 
Western curriculum. Interestingly, the Agenda 2063 advo-
cates a target that ‘at least 80per cent of content in educa-
tional curriculum is on indigenous African culture, values 
and language targeting primary and secondary schools by 
2030’ (AUC 2015, p. 157). This is not reflected in the more 
conservative CESA document, however, where, as we have 
seen, the emphasis is on science and mathematics with no 
mention of the development of indigenous knowledge in the 
strategic objectives.
The above discussion suggests a potentially pivotal role 
for education in developing contemporary understanding 
of African cultures and languages in a way that recognises 
the enormous cultural resources of the continent without 
falling into a naïve relativism about the effects of different 
cultural traditions and the constantly emergent and hybrid 
nature of African cultural forms and identities. It is also 
useful for framing contemporary debates including those 
around ‘decolonising the curriculum’. Further, the discus-
sion suggests an important role for universities in re-orient-
ing research on the continent to focus on African develop-
ment which it has been suggested elsewhere should lie at 
the heart of the African Renaissance project (Tikly 2003). 
Rather, the emphasis in CESA is on the role of universities 
in supporting economic development through promoting sci-
ence and mathematics, innovation and enterprise without 
problematising the cultural basis of the curriculum.
CESA is also silent on the language question except in 
relation to the early years. The pattern of early exit from 
the mother tongue (i.e. a subtractive bilingual approach) 
is very widespread. It reflects the view amongst many par-
ents and policy makers that a good quality education means 
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learning in a European language and the association par-
ticularly between competence in English and access to elite 
jobs (Trudell 2009). This is despite the evidence that learn-
ing in the mother tongue for at least eight years and learn-
ing a global language as a second language (i.e. an additive 
bilingual model) is far more effective for conceptual and 
linguistic development, particularly for learners from dis-
advantaged backgrounds (e.g. Heugh, 2005). A key effect 
of these omissions is to continue to reinforce a separation 
between predominantly Western-oriented elites, fluent in 
European languages who reside largely in the urban areas 
and the urban and rural poor who have not been Westernised 
to the same extent.
Education and the political domain
The understanding of the political domain is more expansive 
than is usually the case in the educational literature in which 
the political domain is often reduced to a consideration of 
the role of the state in education policy. Rather, the present 
account starts from a broader view of ‘polity’ as includ-
ing not just a consideration of the institutions that comprise 
the postcolonial state in Africa but those that comprise 
civil society. Included in the understanding of civil soci-
ety are organisations and individuals that represent distinct 
economic, political and religious/cultural interests that lie 
outside of the gambit of the state and at times have a contra-
dictory relationship with the state. In the African context, 
these include religious organisations, the private sector and 
NGOs for example. Also central to an understanding of the 
polity is the role of violence. The importance of violence 
for people’s well-being, for regimes of inequality, and for 
other institutional domains, is much underestimated in social 
theory and is frequently rendered invisible. This is despite 
the regulation and deployment of violence ‘being part of 
the constitution of social order, complex inequalities and 
globalisation’ (Walby 2009, p. 190).
Colonialism, education and the polity
Global discourses relating to politics and good governance 
often fail to take account of the relative newness of Afri-
can states and their difficult birth as part of the ‘scramble 
for Africa’ (above). At a political level, European colonial-
ism resulted in the introduction of highly centralised and 
authoritarian state structures which were intended to serve 
the interests of the colonisers and did not acknowledge some 
of the complexities of incorporating into one territory of 
diverse ethnic groups and in some instances the challenges 
involved in governing vast, sparsely populated swathes of 
land given limited governmental capacities (Herbst 2000). 
Indigenous elites were assimilated into these existing struc-
tures. As Mamdani (1996) has cogently argued, this led to 
an increasing bifurcation between urban elites subject to the 
power of the colonial state and rural dwellers who were still 
subject to traditional forms of authority—a bifurcation that 
is still evident in the postcolonial era between ‘citizens’ of 
the modern state and ‘subjects’ of more traditional forms of 
authority. The difficulties in instituting democratic rule and 
the use of the state to advance the interests of some ethnic 
groups at the expense of others can, according to Mamdami, 
be traced back to this dynamic.
Although the use of violence pre-dates the colonial 
encounter, colonialism was itself premised on violence, 
whether it was the violent acquisition of territories, the 
forced removal of communities from their lands and liveli-
hoods, the violence of slavery and of indentured servitude, 
the violent suppression of rebellion or the psychological 
trauma caused by the effects of institutionalised racism. 
The cold war fermented state-sponsored violence through 
its role in propping up corrupt and often ethnically exclu-
sive regimes promoting inter-ethnic conflict over land and 
resources. Neoliberalism has fueled inequalities and in turn 
contributed to conflict through the hollowing out of the state 
which has reduced the capacity of the state to prevent vio-
lence. It is in this context that the Agenda 2063 proposes a 
stronger role for the state in dealing with violence. However, 
this role is, in accordance with the good governance agenda, 
seen principally in terms of managing community-based 
conflict through sound institutional frameworks. It does not 
address the fundamentally political nature of violence and 
the extent to which in the postcolonial world, violence is 
embedded in the nature of the state and linked to processes 
of globalisation.
Once again, education policy can be seen as being com-
plicit at a number of levels in the development of contem-
porary forms of the state but has been contradictory in its 
effects. Highly centralised, bureaucratic and undemocratic 
systems of education were introduced under colonial rule. 
For religious bodies, having influence over the education 
system was considered key for achieving their proselytising 
aims. They played a powerful role in spreading Christian and 
Islamic beliefs, often operating in antagonism with indig-
enous belief systems. Islamic and Christian-run schools also 
operated quite different forms of pedagogy and at a cultural 
level projected alternative views of modernity. The churches, 
often vied with each other for control over the education sys-
tem. They sometimes took differing positions either in sup-
port of the colonial administration or against it in the context 
of struggles for national independence and in their relation-
ship to postcolonial governments. In the period following 
independence, churches were often allowed to maintain their 
role as a provider of education and comprise a significant 
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proportion of state-aided and independent secondary and 
primary schools in many African countries.
Nonetheless, at a general level, education under colonial 
education acted as a socialisation mechanism with the aim of 
rendering the colonised economically useful and politically 
docile (Rodney 1973). In this respect, the expansion of sec-
ondary and tertiary education opportunities whilst important 
for providing the skills required to run the colonial adminis-
tration was also contradictory for the wider colonial project 
because it had the unintended consequence of developing 
a cadre of Africans some of whom would go on to lead 
national struggles for independence. During the struggles 
for national liberation from colonial rule on the continent, 
liberation movements emerged from within civil society as 
a direct political and military challenge to White supremacy. 
In some instances, they had an explicit educational agenda.8 
For the most part, however, once national liberation was 
achieved, the education systems often reverted back to the 
path dependency of elitist models of education established 
under colonialism. For those with access, education has con-
tinued to play a socialising role in the post-independence 
era. Education systems have remained highly centralised 
until relatively recently. Schools are also highly authoritar-
ian places in Africa as elsewhere. This is demonstrated in 
the prevalence of formalistic, teacher-centred approaches to 
delivering the curriculum, the often conservative nature of 
the curriculum itself and the lack of opportunity for student 
and teacher voice at an organisational level (Davies 2008).
In relation to the vision of social and environmental jus-
tice offered earlier, there is an important role for education 
in promoting democratic citizenship. CESA also makes a 
call for an expansion of citizenship education (although 
there is little indication on what the content of such an 
education might entail). Neither does the Agenda 2063 or 
CESA acknowledge the role of institutions such as the edu-
cation system in perpetuating violence. Colonial education 
was complicit in perpetrating violence through a number 
of mechanisms that have remained remarkably obdurate. 
For example, the use of corporal punishment which was a 
hallmark of colonial education remains widespread despite 
the efforts of some governments driven by human rights con-
cerns to outlaw its use. Gendered, sexualised violence is also 
widespread in many education systems (Leach 2004). From 
the colonial period, the implicit denigration and belittling 
of indigenous cultures, languages and forms of knowledge 
can be seen as a form of epistemic violence. Education since 
colonial times has also fueled ethnically based violence 
through restricting access to education for some groups.
As commentators have noted, education has a Janus face 
with respect to conflict (Davies 2004; Bush and Salterelli 
2000). It is complicit in perpetuating inequalities in access 
that can fuel violence and has been used by governments 
and civil society political projects to further their political 
ends. The other face is education’s potential role in peace 
building through forms of peace education. Peace education 
has long been advocated as part of a rights-based approach 
to education. The CESA specifically mentions peace educa-
tion as a means for preventing conflict. However, as Bush 
and Salterelli and others have noted, whilst peace education 
can play a positive effect in preventing violence it can only 
be part of a wider set of initiatives aimed at addressing the 
roots of conflict. It also needs to be linked to efforts to trans-
form education systems themselves away from incubators of 
different forms of violence including corporal punishment, 
sexualised violence and epistemic violence.
There are other silences too linked to the social domain 
such as the increasing mobility of youth as a consequence of 
poverty and conflict. It might be expected for example, from 
a rights-based perspective, that a regional agenda would be 
well placed to tackle issues of transnational migration but 
there is a silence around these issues. Rather, the focus is on 
the development of continental and sub-regional integration 
schemes as a means to promote the mobility of students and 
workers, i.e. as a contribution to the mobility of human capi-
tal. Whilst this is important in its own right, the emphasis 
is on economic factors rather than on finding regional solu-
tions to tackling the humanitarian crisis brought on by war, 
conflict and poverty.
Western-inspired neo-liberal reforms have also been 
deeply implicated in changing patterns of governance of 
education. A major implication of neo-liberal inspired 
reform has been a ‘hollowing out’ (Ferguson 2006) of the 
state in Africa. That is to say that whereas states in the post-
independence era were seen as the main vehicles for devel-
opment and were often characterised by assertive Africa-
led leadership, this has been increasingly challenged under 
neoliberalism. One has been the increasing fragmentation of 
education systems as a consequence of an increasing role for 
non-state actors and a lack of regulation and the other has 
been an increasing dependency on donors at the expense of 
indigenously driven policy agendas. This process of hollow-
ing out has also exacerbated rather than easing the problems 
8 The African National Congress (ANC) and Black Conscious-
ness movements in South Africa along with the South West Afri-
can People’s Organisation (SWAPO), for instance had strong edu-
cational agendas (Tikly 1994). The ANC, for example, organised 
its own school on land donated by the Tanzanian government in 
the early 1980s based on a vision of an alternative to Bantu educa-
tion whilst Steve Biko as a figurehead of the Black Consciousness 
movement wrote extensively about education as a means to liberate 
the Black mind from the effects of apartheid and racism (Biko 1978). 
The Tanzania African National Union (later Chama Cha Mapinduzi) 
in Tanzania launched an ambitious adult literacy programme linked 
to a vision of Ujaama (African socialism) that was highly success-
ful in eradicating illiteracy in the early years following independence. 
The relationship between literacy and rural development is noted in 
CESA.
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of the so-called ‘failed states’ in which warlords and bandits 
often assumed the role of governing hard to govern areas 
(Herbst 2000).
Within this historical context of the 1990s the ‘good gov-
ernance’ agenda also emerged, as both an explanation of, 
and solution to, the deficiencies of the Washington Con-
sensus development model (Robertson et al. 2007). Like 
neo-liberal prescriptions for the economy, the good gov-
ernance agenda continues to play a major role in shaping 
how Western governments and multilateral organisations 
‘do business’ with Africa and it is therefore not surprising 
that the good governance agenda features so prominently in 
the Agenda 2063 and CESA as part of the wider inclusive 
growth agenda. As is well documented, however, Chinese 
economic investment in Africa has been accompanied by the 
provision of infrastructure in exchange for favourable access 
to natural resources and land (Mohan 2013). In education 
it has also involved the exercise of soft power through the 
role of Confucius institutes on the continent and making 
available large numbers of scholarships in China for African 
students (King and Palmer 2013).
A characteristic of Chinese development assistance is that 
it has been based on strict adherence to the principles of 
non-interference, a key touchstone of the so-called ‘Beijing 
consensus’ (Ayers 2013). This has led some Western powers 
and institutions such as the World Bank to raise concerns 
about how Chinese development assistance is ‘undermining’ 
Western reform efforts in African economies.9 The implica-
tion for many African countries is the need to deal with an 
increasingly fragmented development assistance architecture 
that comprises not only different kinds of models of ‘part-
nership’ but also engaging with different underlying concep-
tions of modernity and development, in this case Chinese 
and Western.
One way in which the good governance agenda has 
impacted education is in relation to the changing role of 
NGOs. A key feature of the changing educational landscape 
in Africa and other parts of the postcolonial world has been 
the emergence of NGOs as a major player in education and 
other areas of development. The rise of neoliberalism, and 
the good governance agenda, however, saw a change in atti-
tude towards NGOs in which NGOs and other civil society 
organisations were often co-opted by international devel-
opment agencies to a re-packaged programme of welfare 
provision. Increasing amounts of development assistance 
were channelled through NGOs. This provided a safety net 
that served to legitimise the neoliberal state in which eco-
nomic policies focused on austerity were increasingly deter-
mined by international financial institutions. This period saw 
a mushrooming of NGOs in Africa. According to Pinkney 
(2009), NGOs nowadays are concerned either with service 
delivery or with ‘advocacy’. This duel function is evident in 
education with NGOs often making up some of the shortfall 
in educational provision, and increasingly with NGOs such 
as UWEZO10 in East Africa that enjoy significant donor sup-
port in holding governments to account for the quality of 
education. This duel function places NGOs in an ambiguous 
position vis a vis the state, legitimation on the one hand and 
antagonistic on the other.
A further feature of the educational landscape in Africa 
in the past 20 years or so has been a proliferation of philan-
thropic private foundations. Foundations such as the Phelps-
Stokes and Carnegie Foundations have had a role in provid-
ing education and on influencing policy on the continent 
since colonial times in the early part of the twentieth century. 
More recently and driven by diverse philanthropic and ideo-
logical motives, Foundations including the Hewlett Founda-
tion, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Mastercard 
Foundation have played an increasingly prominent role in 
funding education and in shaping policy at a global scale, 
e.g. through their involvement in the Global Partnership for 
Education. Besides advocating a role for the private sector 
in the provision of education, CESA is silent on the role of 
civil society in the education sector which given the history 
and scale of involvement can be seen as an omission. From 
a complex systems perspective such as that underlying the 
present analysis, the role of civil society can also be seen to 
have contributed to the increasing fragmentation and lack of 
coherence in education systems. In many African countries, 
for example, private schools remain largely unregulated and 
therefore outside of the ambit of national education policy 
(Verger et al. 2018; Day et al. 2014). This poses a real chal-
lenge for regional and national policy agendas.
9 As commentators such as Ayers and Mohan point out, however, 
such concerns smack of hypocrisy in that Chinese investments in 
Africa fall far short of Western interests and that raising such con-
cerns elides the role of the West since colonial times in supporting 
undemocratic practices on the continent. In this regard, as Ferguson 
notes, a perverse effect of neo-liberal policies has been that economic 
growth has often occurred in enclaves within highly dysfunctional 
states.
10 UWEZO means ‘capability’ in Kiswahili. It aims to improve lit-
eracy and numeracy amongst children in the basic education cycle 
through what it claims are citizen-driven approaches to accountabil-
ity. UWEZO produces the results of a literacy and numeracy test that 
it administers annually so as to draw attention to poor learning out-
comes in schools (see http://www.uwezo .net/). UWEZO often oper-
ates in an antagonistic relationship with Ministries of Education in 
the countries concerned.
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Conclusion: towards a transformative 
agenda?
The visions of SD and of ESD in regional agendas hold out 
an ambitious, pan-African vision of transformative change. 
As such they represent the antithesis of much contemporary 
development thinking about Africa. However, whilst it is 
important to avoid falling into a new kind of afro pessimism, 
it is also important to be realistic about the possibilities for 
change. It is argued that although education has enjoyed 
contradictory relations with the domains of the economy, 
culture and the policy, for the most part education systems 
have been implicated in processes of unsustainable devel-
opment in relation to each. In economic terms, education 
has been implicated in the reproduction of extractive eco-
nomic policies that have favoured global interests and those 
of indigenous elites and have had destructive effects on the 
natural environment. In cultural terms, education has been 
implicated in what de Sousa Santos (2012; Santos 2017) 
describes as processes of cultural and linguistic ‘epistemi-
cide’. Finally, in political terms, education has contributed to 
the perpetuation of violence and processes of undemocratic 
governance in the context of the postcolonial polity.
In this respect, regional agendas do not go far enough 
in identifying the underlying causal mechanisms that give 
rise to unsustainable development that have their roots in 
the colonial encounter and the nature of contemporary 
globalisation or in acknowledging the extent to which 
education systems have been complicit in reproducing the 
interests of colonial and postcolonial elites and in pro-
cesses of unsustainable development. They also prioritise 
instrumentalist concerns that despite the rhetoric, do too 
little to advance the interests of the poor and marginalised 
on the continent or contribute to environmental protection.
If education is to play a role in transformative change 
then it will need to be fundamentally re-oriented away from 
its current path dependency which it has inherited since 
colonial times and which has proved remarkably resilient 
to change. Understanding the tensions and contradictions 
inherent in regional policy in relation to an analysis of wider 
processes of change can assist in comprehending the nature 
and scale of the challenges and possibilities for implement-
ing transformative education for sustainable development. 
However, whereas dominant theories of the role of educa-
tion in relation to development including human capital and 
modernization theory and ideas like the knowledge economy 
often assume education can act as a panacea for develop-
ment, the analysis presented above suggests a more complex 
relationship. If education is to play a genuinely transforma-
tive role then it cannot do this alone but must be linked to 
processes of wider structural change across each of these 
three domains of the economy, culture and polity.
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